Wednesday, 9 March 2016

Supreme Court of India holds ‘officers’ of private banks to be public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act

The Supreme Court of India in a landmark judgment held officers of private banks to be public servants under the country’s principal anti corruption legislation - the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PCA”). The bench comprising of Justices Ranjan Gogoi and PC Pant delivered their judgement on 23rd February 2016 in the matter of Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities & Fraud Cell versus Ramesh Gelli and Others.[1]

Brief facts:

In August 2004, Global Trust Bank, a private bank in India amalgamated / merged with the Oriental Bank of Commerce which is a public sector bank. Allegations were levelled against Mr Ramesh Gelli (Chairman & Managing Director) and Mr Sridhar Subasri (Executive Director) of the Global Trust Bank that at their behest loans were sanctioned and disbursed “by throwing all prudent banking norms to winds” which resulted in the creation of a large quantum of non performing assets, thereby compromising the interests of the bank’s depositors. These allegations pertained to the pre-amalgamation period but were brought to light as a result of an audit after the amalgamation.

India’s premiere investigation agency - the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) investigated the matter and accordingly filed a charge sheet before the Special Judge (CBI), against the accused persons charging them with the commission of offences under the Indian Penal Code[2] and the PCA (Section 13[3] – Criminal misconduct by a public servant). The Special Judge (CBI), declined to take cognizance against Mr Ramesh Gelli and Mr Sridhar Subasri of the offences punishable under the PCA, on the grounds that were not public servants at the time of the alleged transactions. The Bombay High Court on appeal upheld this view of the Special Judge (CBI).

The CBI thereafter filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court of India, which was clubbed, with a writ petition filed by Mr Ramesh Gelli, as similar questions of law were involved in both petitions, and thus a common order was passed.

Provisions of law in question:

The Supreme Court was focussed on the following provisions of law:

A.    Section 2 (b) of the PCA – "public duty" means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest

B.    Section 2 (c) (viii) of the PCA – “any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty”

C.   Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (“BRA”)

This provision is at the heart of the matter, as it provides for officers of a bank to be deemed as public servants for the purposes of Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code. The section reads as follows:

“Every chair­man who is appointed on a whole-time basis, managing director, director, auditor], liquidator, manager and any other employee of a banking company shall be deemed to be a public servant for the purposes of Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

It is pertinent to mention that when the PCA was enacted, Sections 161-165A contained in Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code were repealed and the said offences were embodied in the substantive sections (7-12) of the PCA.

What the Supreme Court held:

The Supreme Court thus was required to adjudicate on “whether the Chairman, Directors and Officers of Global Trust Bank Ltd. (a private bank before its amalgamation with the Oriental Bank of Commerce), can be said to be public servants for the purposes of their prosecution in respect of offences punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or not ?”

The court reasoned that the objectives of the PCA clearly specified that the statute was to “make the anti corruption law more effective and widen its coverage.” The BRA deemed officers of banks to be public servants and thus, the pith and substance of Section 46A would not be defeated merely because the PCA repealed Section 161-165A of the Indian Penal Code and an express provision to this effect was not made in Section 46A of the BRA. Taking exception to the rule of cassus omissus (what has not been provided for in the statute cannot be supplied by the Courts), the Court held that the legislative intent to widen the ambit of the country’s anti corruption law and the definition of “public servant” can not be defeated due to a mere omission in Section 46A of the BRA. This omission was held to be capable of “being filled up by the court”.

After conjointly reading the provisions of the PCA with Section 46A of the BRA, the court harmoniously constructed them to determine in the affirmative that officers of a private banking company would fall under the definition of a public servant as defined in the PCA. The matter was therefore, remanded back to the trial court to take cognisance of the offences punishable under the PCA.

Impact:

The judgment has provided law enforcement authorities with considerable clarity on the conflict between the provisions of the PCA and BRA, thus now enabling them to charge private bankers under the country’s anti corruption law. The judgement thus in the context of private bankers fills the void in the statute books of a substantive offence of commercial bribery, while the Ministry of Home Affairs still sits over its proposal to introduce commercial bribery in the Indian Penal Code.

It would be imperative to mention that the Supreme Court’s judgement comes at the backdrop of India battling a major non-performing asset crisis, where several banks have been accused of sanctioning loans without following due process. It is highly likely (and hoped) that law enforcement will explore the ‘quid pro quo’ angle more seriously now that private bank officers can be charged with the PCA.

Private banks should consider risk mapping the potential for criminal misconduct with respect to the sanction of loans to non-performing assets, and of course strengthen their compliance programs to incorporate elements of the PCA. Officers of private banks must understand the nuances of criminal liability that the PCA would cast on them, which would is a considerable departure from the earlier substantive position of the law.

In the same breath of optimism and without casting an aspersion on the deterrent value of this judgement, it is hoped that our enforcement statistics do not continue to remain abysmal.



[1] Criminal Appeal Nos. 1077-1081 OF 2013 with Central Bureau of Investigation through Superintendent of Police, BS & FC & Anr. Versus Ramesh Gelli, Writ Petition (CRL.) NO. 167 OF 2015.
[2] Section 120B read with Sections 409 and 420.
[3] Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PCA.

No comments:

Post a Comment